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This article evaluates the effects of two types of rewards (performance-contingent versus
engagement-contingent) on self-regulation, intrinsic motivation and creativity. Forty-two under-
graduate students were randomly assigned to three conditions; i.e. a performance-contingent
reward group, an engagement-contingent reward group and a control group. Results provide little
support for the negative effects of performance rewards on motivational components. However,
they do indicate that participants in the engagement-contingent reward group and the control
group achieved higher rated creativity than participants in the performance-contingent reward
group. Alternative explanations for this finding are discussed.
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Introduction
During the last three decades, researchers have tried to localise the mechanism that
makes individuals persistent in creative achievement (Amabile, 1996). Both
theoretical models and empirical studies are consistent with the notion that intrinsic
motivation is conducive to creative performance (Amabile, 1979, 1982b, 1983;
Amabile, Hennessey & Grossman, 1986; Reeve & Deci, 1996). Persons who engage
in an activity for its own sake are intrinsically motivated. When intrinsically
motivated, persons are motivated simply to perform an activity and to have the
spontaneous experiences of interest, enjoyment, excitement and satisfaction that
accompany the behaviour. Intrinsic motivation encompasses exploration, spontane-
ity, autonomy and interest in one’s surroundings (Deci & Ryan, 1996; Deci, Ryan &
Koestner, 1999).
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The aim of this study is to examine how reward contingencies affect self-
determination to perform a creative activity. Research in this area has typically
focused on intrinsic motivation and its determinants (Deci & Ryan, 2000) and
supported self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985) in that changes in intrinsic
motivation are the result of changes in perceived self-determination or perceived
competence (Vallerand & Bissonette, 1992). Research on various types of extrinsic
motivation and the internalisation of externally motivated behaviour, however, is
scarce. An exception is the study by Grouzet, Vallerand, Thill and Provencher
(2004), who found that environmental factors, such as success or failure, influenced
perceptions of competence, autonomy and relatedness (psychological need factors).
These factors, in turn, determined the extent to which self-determined motivation
was exhibited.
Self-determination theory, like other organism models (Deci & Ryan, 1996),
assumes that people are proactive to the extent that their engagement with their
surroundings leads to an elaborated and refined set of internal processes and
structures. One important aspect of these theories is people’s natural tendency to
internalise values and behavioural regulations in their social world and to make those
values their own (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Being proactive, individuals adjust to the
world by internalising and integrating the values and regulations that allow them to
behave more effectively (Ryan, 1993).
It is through this process that extrinsically motivated behaviours that are initially
externally prompted can become increasingly internalised and result in greater self-
regulation (Ryan, 1982). Internalisation involves people’s transformation of external
regulatory processes into internal regulatory processes (Deci & Ryan, 1996; Deci,
Ryan & Koestner, 1999). Integration is the process through which these internalised
regulations are assimilated with one’s self (Plucker & Runco, 1998; Ryan, 1993). As
an external regulation becomes internalised and integrated, the person becomes
more fully self-regulating of that behaviour. The person then experiences that the
perceived locus of causality has shifted from external to internal (Deci, Ryan &
Koestner, 1999; Vallerand & Bissonette, 1992).
Self-determination theory specifies four types of extrinsic motivation that result
from the process of internalisation (Deci & Ryan, 1996; Ryan & Connell, 1989). The
more fully a regulation has been internalised, the more it represents integration and
thus provides the basis for self-determination and volitional behaving. The four types
of extrinsic regulations are ordered along a continuum from being relatively
controlled to relatively self-determined (external, introjected, identified and
integrated regulation).
External regulation is referred to behaviours that are controlled by external
demands and pressures (Decci & Ryan, 1996; Ryan & Connell, 1989). This
regulation represents the lowest level of internalisation. Introjected regulation is
controlled by demands inside the person, for example by self-esteem contingencies.
Hence, both external and introjected regulation refer to controlled motivation, that is,
doing an activity by obligation in order to obtain something positive or to avoid
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something negative outside the activity. Identified regulation denotes behaviours that
are chosen because the individual identifies with the importance of the value or the
activity. Integrated regulation represents the highest level of internalisation where the
individual identifies the values or the activities as an expression of one’s self.
Integrated regulation is also referred to be fully self-determined and, as such, is
similar to intrinsic motivation. Therefore, both identified and integrated regulation
represent autonomous or self-determined motivation that is, doing an externally
regulated activity by choice in order to obtain something positive or avoid something
negative outside the activity. The study by Grouzet et al. (2004) revealed that
experiencing perceptions of competence, autonomy and relatedness will facilitate
self-determined motivation, as people are likely to return freely to the activities that
satisfy their psychological needs. Accordingly, also, environmental factors may have
the ability to positively influence self-determined motivation. This study explores the
question of whether activities conducted under performance- and engagement-
contingent rewards can affect creativity by becoming internalised and integrated in
individuals’ self-regulation.
Reward Contingencies
One major aspect must be considered while doing research on tangible rewards and
that is if the reward is expected or not. If rewards are not expected while a person is
working on a creativity task, they are not predicted to affect motivation (Lepper,
Henderlong & Gingras, 1999), because the person is not likely to experience the task
as being controlled by the rewards. A distinction may therefore be made between
controlling and informative extrinsic motivators (see also Collins & Amabile, 1999).
It has also been suggested that the cognitive style (adaptive or innovative) of the
recipient may play a part in whether or not the extrinsic motivation will benefit
creativity (Baer, Oldham, & Cummings, 2003).
For expected rewards, Ryan, Mims and Koestner (1983) presented a typology of
reward-contingencies that have been widely assessed in later research (Hennessey,
2000): task-non-contingent rewards, which are given to individuals for something other
than engaging in the target activities, such as participating in a study; task-contingent
rewards which are given to individuals if the they complete the target activity, such as
solving the problem that is administered within this study and, finally, performance-
contingent rewards, which are given only if the individual’s performance matches given
criteria or if one pushes participants to reach the top 20% in terms of performance.
However, even if there is a theoretical distinction between task-contingent and task-
non-contingent rewards, studies have indicated that they are experienced by reward
recipients as very similar to each other (Deci, Ryan & Koestner, 1999; Pittman,
Davey, Alafat, Wetherill & Kramer, 1980) and therefore referred to as engagement-
contingent rewards.
Then, to what degree do the activities conducted under these reward-
contingencies become internalised? A large amount of research examining the
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effects of reward on motivation has taken place for at least three decades
(Eisenberger, Pierce & Cameron, 1999; Deci, Ryan & Koestner, 1999). The focus
has not been on to what degree rewards affect self-determination through the process
of internalisation, instead, intrinsic motivation has been the dependent measure. By
reasoning alone, this derives from the pioneer studies that examined how crucial it is
for individuals to experience intrinsic motivation in order to achieve higher creativity
(Amabile, 1979, 1982b, 1983; Amabile, Hennessey & Grossman, 1986), to
experience a target activity as more interesting (Ryan, Mims & Koestner, 1983)
and to achieve higher academic grades (Grolnick & Ryan, 1987; Ryan & Connell,
1989). Up until quite recently, few studies have examined how external events
become internalised and integrated, probably because of the notion that extrinsically
motivated behaviour is less crucial for performance than for intrinsically motivated
behaviour.
One of the advantages of measuring self-regulated and self-determined behaviour
through the process of internalisation is that both theoretical models and empirical
measures differentiate extrinsic motivation into four ordered types (Ryan & Connell,
1989). This makes it possible to distinguish between different types of motivation
and to specify their effects on performance. Ryan, Connell and Plant (1990), for
example, tested how different levels of self-regulation affected memory retrieval in
educational settings. Schiefele (1991) measured how the level of interest in
education correlated with the levels of self-regulation. Both studies found an
increase of their dependent measure (memory retrieval and interest) in proportion to
the level of self-regulation. Vallerand and Bissonette (1992) also found that low self-
regulated individuals to a larger extent drop out of college courses than high self-
regulated individuals do.
Another aspect on why the internalisation approach is more appropriate is that one
can never take for granted that individuals experience intrinsic motivation. Despite
the fact that self-determination theory proposes that intrinsic motivation is a natural
tendency for individuals to experience (Deci & Ryan, 1996), individuals sometimes
engage in activities for attaining some rewards or to gain approval (Reeve & Deci,
1996) and sometimes experience a lack of motivation. Therefore, by measuring how
external events become internalised into the regulatory process, one can more fully
understand how the external event is experienced and, more importantly, evaluate
the potential of the external event as being positive or negative for motivation and
performance.
As noted earlier, external events influence individuals perceived self-determination
via their controlling and informational aspects (Deci & Ryan, 1996; Reeve & Deci,
1996) and provide either positive or negative effects on performance/intrinsic
motivation. According to a meta-analytic study by Deci, Ryan and Koestner (1999),
some rewards have an undermining effect on intrinsic motivation. Task-contingent
and task-non-contingent rewards that are referred to be engagement-contingent did
not undermine intrinsic motivation, using both free-choice behavioural and self-
report measures. Completion-contingent rewards (i.e. placing importance at the
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completing of one or more tasks), on the other hand, led to a significant undermining
of intrinsic motivation, as did performance-contingent rewards (for free-choice
measures, but not for self-reports).
As could be seen, engagement-contingent rewards did not undermine intrinsic
interest to perform a target activity that could be explained by its non-controlling
component (Reeve & Deci, 1996). The reasons why individuals participate in such
studies are not solely for external reasons, the rewards are not demanding a person to
perform well and intrinsic motivation remains intact (Ross, 1975). However,
completion and performance-contingent rewards did undermine intrinsic interest to
perform an activity, except for self-report measurements. Completion- and
performance-contingent rewards clearly have a controlling component that forces
the individual to perform an activity (Hennessey, 2000). The more controlling an
external event is, the less it represents values that match an individual and the less it
will be internalised (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick & Leone, 1994). It seems that the crucial
component for both extrinsic (in order to be intemalised) and intrinsic motivation (in
order to increase or remain) is the informational aspect of an external event. The
more an event is experienced as controlling, the less it represents values for an
increase of self-determination towards activities. Accordingly, we expect to find a
larger degree of internalisation of activities conducted under engagement-contingent
rewards (task-contingent and task-non-contingent rewards) than for activities
conducted under performance-contingent rewards. Hypothesis 1a: Activities con-
ducted under engagement-contingent rewards will be more internalised in
individual’s regulatory process than performance-contingent rewards.
Rewards and Creativity
The study of human creativity has interested many researchers and thinkers over the
years, not only in psychology, but more recently in economic and organisational
disciplines (Garud, Nayyar & Shapira, 1997). Creativity has been highly valued as it
is considered to be a good predictor of invention (Amabile, 1997; Shalley, 1991)
and, as such, crucial for companies if they are to continue to grow and to prosper
(DeVamia & Tichy, 1990). Creativity has, for example, also been found to promote
long-term academic success (Peterson, Swing, Braveman, & Buss, 1982; Pintrich &
deGroot, 1990).
The use of rewards in organisations and everyday life are surprisingly large
(Hennessey, 2000), considering the detrimental effects many rewards may have on
motivation and performance (Deci, Ryan, & Koestner, 1999). Research suggests that
rewards for novel performance increase intrinsic motivation and creativity
(Eisenberger & Shanock, 2003). However, if conventional performance is rewarded
it will decrease intrinsic motivation and creativity.
There is, of course, little doubt that expected rewards have a detrimental effect on
creativity, as rewards have been shown by a large amount of research (Deci, Ryan &
Koestner, 1999) to have a general detrimental effect on motivation and performance.
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The question is whether this relationship can actually be explained by the degree to
which activities conducted under rewards are becoming internalised. Accordingly, in
this study we emphasise to alter the traditional perspective of rewards by examining
to what extent activities conducted under rewards become internalised in the
regulatory process. In doing so, one can expect to find a relationship between the
level of internalisation and the level of creativity produced. To illustrate, the more an
activity conducted under a reward becomes internalised, the more it represents self-
determined behaviour (Deci & Ryan, 1996; Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994;
Ryan, Connell, & Plant, 1990). Consequently, creative performance should be
higher for greater levels of internalisation. More specifically, persons who act in the
presence of a performance-contingent reward should be more controlled by the
reward and therefore produce less qualitative creative responses compared to
persons who act in the presence of an engagement-contingent reward. The latter
should produce more qualitative creative responses, whereas persons who do not
receive any kind of reward should produce the most creative responses (Amabile,
1979, 1982b, 1983; Amabile, Hennessey & Grossman, 1986), due to the non-
constrained environment. That is, no external events control why the person engages
in the activity. Hypothesis 1b: Individuals who are offered a performance-contingent
reward will show a lower level of internalisation and produce less qualitative creative
responses than individuals who are offered an engagement-contingent reward.
Hypothesis 1c: Individuals who do not receive any kind of reward will produce the
most qualitative creative responses.
Methods
Participants
Forty-two (31 women and 11 men) undergraduate students in psychology at Va¨xjo¨
University participated in the experiment. They were recruited as participants to
match the given creativity task and were randomly assigned to each condition. All
students were at the end of, or have finished, their second semester in psychology.
The students were asked in class whether or not they were interested in taking part in
an experiment that measured their attitudes to, and experience of, scientific research.
No rewards of any form were promised in connection to their participation.
Materials
Internalisation. The level of internalisation was measured using a variant of the
Academic Motivation Scale (AMS-C28) developed by Robert J. Vallerand, Luc G.
Pelletier, Marc R. Blais, Nathalie M. Brie`re, Caroline B. Sene´cal and Evelyne F.
Vallie`res (Vallerand & Bissonnette, 1992; Vallerand, Blais, Brie´re, & Pelletier,
1989), which assesses motivational styles towards academic activities. The AMS
assesses the four types of extrinsic motivation; external, introjected, identified and
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integrated regulation. This scale is an extensive version of the Academic Self-
Regulation Questionnaire (ASRQ) developed by Ryan and Connell (Ryan &
Connell, 1989; Grolnick & Ryan, 1987) and the main difference between the two is
that ASRQ was developed for elementary schoolchildren and AMS for college
students. In this study, some of the target words of AMS were replaced with words to
match the given creativity task, for example the word studies was replaced with a
word like task. The AMS reliability was shown to be high, with an overall Cronbachs
alpha of a5.74 (Vallerand & Bissonette, 1992) and therefore supports the self-
determination continuum of the four subscales. Since only target words were
replaced, there is no reason to believe that the variant of the AMS that was used in
this study is any different from the original AMS. The rest of the formulations
remained intact. Item correlation analysis of the version used in this study was
indicated to be large, Cronbach’s alpha of a5.79, therefore yielding preliminary
support to the validity of the scale (see results, for a more detailed analysis for the
reliability of the scale).
In this version of the AMS, participants were instructed to rate how well 16 items
were true for them in relation to this statement: ‘‘I participate in this study and carry
out the research-related task because of…’’ Each of the four subscales consisted of
four items and was ranged in a scale from 1 (not true at all) to 7 (completely true).
An example of an external item was: ‘‘It is expected of me to carry out the task’’;
example of an introjected item was: ‘‘To show myself that I am an intelligent
person’’; an example of an identified item was: ‘‘I find psychological research to be
important’’; and an example of an integrated item was: ‘‘My psychology education
will make me develop if I learn how to solve research-related tasks’’.
Validity analysis. In order to provide preliminary support of the validity of the AMS
used in this study, the intercorrelation across the four motivational subscales was
computed. Support for the validity of the scale would be obtained if the correlations
displayed a simplex structure. A simplex structure is supported if positive
correlations between adjacent subscales are obtained and these become
progressively less positive and gradually negative, as the scales are farther apart.
The correlation matrix appears in Table 1. As this Table shows, the pattern of
correlations supports the simplex structure. The highest positive correlations were
obtained between adjacent scales (e.g. integrated and identified regulation: r5.46),
Table 1. Correlation matrix across the four motivational subscales (n542)
Subscale Integrated Identified Introjected External
Integrated –
Identified .461** –
Introjected .355* .426** –
External 2.158 .047 .415** –
Notes: *significant, p,.05; **significant, p,.01.
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while the most negative correlations were obtained between scales at the opposite
ends of the continuum (e.g. integrated and external regulation: r52.16). Further,
the item correlation analysis of the AMS revealed a Cronbach’s alpha of a5.79. The
value-inflated factor of the sub-scales was smaller than 10, indicating that no
collinearity was at hand. Overall, these results provide preliminary support for the
validity of the scale.
To measure the self-determination continuum, the Relative Autonomy Index
(RAT: Grolnick & Ryan, 1987, 1989) was used. The RAT is appropriate to use
because it indicates whether individuals are dominantly self-determined or non-self-
determined (Vallerand & Bissonnette, 1992; Vallerand, Blais, Brie´re & Pelletier,
1989). This is conducted by weighting each of the four motivational subscales on the
self-determination continuum from external to integrated regulation and then
summing the products. Integrated regulation represents the highest form of self-
determination and is thus given the highest positive weight (+2). Identified
regulation also represents a self-determined regulation but is lower than for
integrated regulation and is therefore given a lower positive weight (+1). In contrast,
introjected (21) and external (22) regulations represent lower forms of self-
determined behaviour and are therefore negatively weighted. The RAT scale ranged
from 272 to +72.
Creativity. One perspective of viewing and defining creativity is the consensual
assessment technique of creativity (CAT: Amabile, 1982a). The technique asserts
evaluation of products and ideas generated in real-life settings (Hennessey &
Amabile, 1988). This moves the CAT in a clear opposition with the majority of
theoretical assumptions and tests that traditionally have dominated the creativity
area (Barron & Harrington, 1981; Piedmont, 1998; Plucker & Runco, 1998;
Torrance, 1972). The technique was developed by Amabile and has been widely
assessed in research (Shalley, 1995; Shalley & Perry-Smith, 2000). The clear
advantage of this technique is that one can evaluate creative responses or even
creative processes in real-life settings (individually or in groups), and at the same
time keep a trustworthy validity (Amabile, 1982a; 1996). The technique calls for
the use of expert judges. Expert judges are those familiar with the domain in which
the creativity task is set. The technique is based on social judgements and uses the
judges’ implicit theories about what they think is creative (for a more detailed
description about the technique, see Amabile, 1982a, 1996). Creativity is defined by
the consensual assessment technique as follows:
‘‘A product or response is creative to the extent that appropriate observers independently
agree it is creative. Appropriate observers are those familiar with the domain in which the
product was created or the response articulated. Thus, creativity can be regarded as the
quality of products or responses judged to be creative by appropriate observers, and it
can also be regarded as the process by which something so judged is produced.’’
(Amabile, 1982a)
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A creativity task was designed and consisted of a research-related problem,
developed to match the participant’s psychology education. As can be seen, the
participants were instructed to come up with as creative solutions as possible and to
solve the task in a correct ethical way. We were also interested in assessing the
functionality of the creative responses. An idea can be very creative but have no
practical use, e.g. highly expensive, impractical or illegal. Therefore, two dependent
measures were administered, creativity and functionality. The ethical value was a
part of the functionality dimension. Similar creativity tasks have been used in other
studies (Amabile, 1979, 1983, 1982a, 1982b; Amabile, Hennessey & Grossman,
1986; Shalley & Perry-Smith, 2000), that is, the design of the tasks has been open-
ended. In fact, for the CAT of creativity to function fully, it is crucial that the task is
designed to have several not predetermined exits (Amabile, 1996), thus, the final
creativity task was:
N How would you design a scientific study to answer the question if an individual
disposition causes a malfunctioning behaviour? Try to come up with as creative
solutions as possible and the study should be designed in a correct ethical way. To
help you have the following lists of equipment: (a) a laboratory along with a
number of PCs, (b) a projector, (c) a copying machine to print forms with, (d)
envelopes to send to the participants, (e) a portable tape-recorder with cassette
tapes. It is optional to use the equipment, i.e. you are not bound to use them in
order to solve the task. Besides that, you have free hands to solve the task.
Scoring creativity. The participant’s responses were scored and analysed using the
CAT technique. Three independent graduate students in psychology served as
expert judges. The judges were recruited because they had the relevant degree in
psychology to determine the grade of creativity and functionality in each response
(see Amabile, 1982a, 1996 for a more detailed description of judges). The responses
were scored from 1 (non-creative and non-functional) to 7 (highly creative and
highly functional). The interjudge reliability for the judge’s ratings was computed
using the intraclass correlation (ICC) method (Bartkro, 1966; Shrout & Fleiss,
1979). The ICC sets the judges to be a random effect, which is the opposite of the
standard coefficient alpha. The advantage of not setting the judges to be a fixed
effect, is that the judges ratings can be generalised to a larger population of judges
from which the judges were drawn (Amabile, 1996). However, results from the ICC
and the coefficient alpha often yield similar results. The interjudge reliability across
the judges had a value for creativity of .62 and for functionality of .46. The mean of
the three judges ratings were then set to indicate the creativity and functionality in
each response.
Procedure
The AMS questionnaire and the creativity task were offered to all students taking
their second semester in psychology. Another group of students who had finished
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their second semester were also offered a chance to participate. Those who decided
to participate in the study were then randomly assigned to each condition, i.e.
performance-contingent reward group, engagement-contingent reward group or a
control group. The participants were initially instructed that the aim of the study was
to investigate their attitudes and experience towards studying and working with
research. Being psychology students, they encounter such matters throughout their
entire education. They were also instructed that they would have to discuss and to
solve a research-related problem, with no mention being made of creativity or any
kind of information connected to the AMS. Creativity has been found to be an
emotionally charged word (Ruscio, Whitney & Amabile, 1998) and the use of such a
word initially could seriously have harmed the study.
Participants in the performance- and the engagement-contingent reward group
were first offered a salient reward. Participants in the control group were not offered
a reward. The reward consisted of a Ballograph pen with Va¨xjo University’s emblem
printed upon it. Similar rewards have been widely used in research with surprisingly
large success and often rewards have a limited value of only $2 (Deci, Ryan &
Koestner, 1999).
Participants in the performance-contingent reward group received a written
instruction that the reward was to be given to them if their achievements in solving
the task ended up at the top 20% of all responses. Participants in the engagement-
contingent reward group received a written instruction that the reward was to be
given to them if they participated in the study. They were also instructed that the
reward was to be given to them at one of the following lectures in their education
program. After any reward offering was made, the participant filled out the AMS and
the creativity task. They also filled out some demographic data: gender, total length
of college education and their name. I wanted to make sure that the length of each
participant’s total college education (other than psychology) didn’t have anything to
do with their scores on creativity. All participants completed the AIvIS questionnaire
and the creativity task in less than one hour and were then dismissed. The
participants who were offered a reward also received that.
At a later stage, the judges received instructions that they would have to score each
response level of creativity and functionality based upon Guilford’s (1967) definition
of creative solutions:
‘‘(1) Judge on a scale from 1 (non-creative) to 7 (highly creative) whether you think the
solution is creative in the sense that it culminates to original ideas. (2) Judge on a scale
from 1 (non-functional) to 7 (highly functional) it’s practical use including ethical, cost,
legal and time absorbing values.’’
The judges were also instructed that the two measurements should be rated
independently of each other and, importantly, to rate everything written in each
response, including any proposed methods and discussions. Information about
which condition, gender, total college education and scores on AMS for each
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response was not available to the judges. Further, the judges independently analysed
the responses in opposite order, all according to the CAT (Amabile, 1982a, 1996).
Results
Controlling background variables. From here on, the Relative Autonomy Index (RAI)
represents the four motivational subscales combined. A 2 x 3 (Gender x RAI,
Creativity and Functionality) univariate analysis of variance was conducted to ensure
that no gender differences influenced the scores on RAI, creativity and functionality.
Results indicated no main effect for gender on RAI (F[1, 41]50.126; p5.72),
creativity (F[1, 41]51.65; p5.21) and functionality (F[1, 41]5.22; p5.64). Further,
Gender x RAT interaction was non-significant on creativity (F[1, 41]5
1.089; p5.47) and functionality (F[1, 41]50.72; p5.674).
Descriptive statistics. Participants in the performance-contingent reward group
displayed a mean score in self-regulation (RAI) of M51.14 (range: 224 to +21),
creativity of M53.42 and functionality of M53.80. Participants in the engagement-
contingent reward group had a mean score in self-regulation of M59.71 (range:214
to +29), creativity of M54.42 and functionality of M54.26. The participants in the
control group had a mean score in self-regulation of M511.57 (range: 25 to +29),
creativity of M54.47 and functionality of M53.97. Descriptive statistics for the
three groups on self-regulation (RAI), creativity and functionality appears in Table 2.
Reward groups and internalisation. A multivariate analysis of variance (type of reward
group x the four motivational subscales) was conducted on type of reward group as
independent variable and the scores on the four motivational subscales as dependent
Table 2. Mean scores and standard deviations of the three groups on RAI, creativity and
functionality
Responsea
Condition n RAIb Creativity Functionality
Performance reward group 14
M 1.14 3.42 3.80
SD 14.50 0.83 0.71
Engagement reward group 14
M 9.71 4.42 4.26
SD 13.22 0.75 0.95
Control Group 14
M 11.57 4.47 3.97
SD 10.91 1.18 0.87
Notes: The RAI scale represents four motivational subscales combined; athe responses were ranged from min.
1p to max. 7p; bthe RAI scale was ranged from min. 272p to max. +72p. The higher score, the greater the self-
regulation.
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variables. Results indicated no significant differences on external (F[2, 41]5.480;
p5.62), introjected (F[2, 41]5.01; p5.99) and identified regulations (F[2, 41]
51.81; p5.18) between the three reward groups. However, a marginal significance
was obtained on integrated regulation (F[2, 41]52.73; p5.08) between the three
reward groups. Participants in the control group had a mean score on integrated
regulation of M518.85 p whereas participants in the engagement and performance-
contingent reward group had a mean score of M516.07 p and M514.71 p
respectively. Post hoc (Tukey) analysis indicated a marginal difference between the
control group and the performance-contingent reward group on integrated
regulation (p5.09), indicated no difference between the performance and the
engagement-contingent reward group (p5.96) and no difference between the
engagement-contingent reward group and the control group (p5.16). Mean scores
and standard deviations of the three groups scores on the four motivational sub
scales appear in Table 3.
An overall univariate analysis of variance (type of reward group x RAI) was also
conducted on type of reward group as independent variable and the RAI as the
dependent variable to test whether there was a difference between the three groups
on their total scores on self-regulation (RAI). Results indicated only a marginal
significance between the three groups total scores on self-regulation (F[2, 41]52.57;
p5.089). Post hoc (Tukey) analysis indicated a marginal difference between the
control group and the performance-contingent reward group on self-regulation, RAI
(p5.10), no difference between the performance and the engagement-contingent
reward group (p5.20) and no difference between the engagement-contingent reward
group and the control group (p5.92).
Reward groups, creativity, and functionality. A multivariate analysis of variance (type
of reward group x creativity and functionality) was carried out on type of reward
group as independent variable and the scores on creativity and functionality as
Table 3. Mean scores and standard deviations of the three groups on the four subscales of self-
regulation
Condition n
External
regulation
Introjected
regulation
Identified
regulation
Integrated
regulation
Performance reward
group
14
M 15.85 13,71 16,42 14,71
SD 5.15 4,58 3,73 2,75
Engagement reward
group
14
M 13.85 12,42 17,42 16,07
SD 4.92 5,54 4,66 5,43
Control group 14
M 15.00 13,57 17,28 18,85
SD 4.15 4,75 3,70 6,43
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dependent variables in order to see if the three reward groups differed in creativity
and functionality. As hypothesised, there was a significant difference between the
three groups on creativity (F[2.4l]55.48; p5.01) but not for functionality (F[2, 41]
51.01; p5.37). The highest mean scores in creativity were obtained by participants
in the control group, M54.47, followed by participants in the engagement-
contingent reward group, M54.42 and finally, M53.42 for participants in the
performance-contingent reward group. Post hoc (Tukey) analysis indicated a
significant difference between the engagement and the performance-contingent
reward group (p5.02), a significant difference between the control group and the
performance-contingent reward group (p5.01) and no difference between the
control group and the engagement-contingent reward group (p5.99).
Note that the level of creativity was not significantly correlated with the level of
functionality: r5.24; p5.12. This means, for example, that the responses could be
highly creative but non-functional or non-creative but highly functional.
Mediation analysis. Self-regulation was thought to act as a mediator between the
reward groups and the responses creativity and functionality. In the present study,
it was hypothesised that the effects of reward contingencies on the responses
creativity and functionality were affected through the process of internalisation.
The four subscales of self-regulation were therefore examined in regression
analysis for potential mediation roles in reward’s impact on creativity and
functionality. However, the levels of self-regulation did not predict creativity nor
did it predict functionality. Results of the two regression analyses appear in
Table 4. It must be noted that a complete mediation analysis investigating the
relationships between all the relevant variables was not carried out, partly due to
the discouraging results.
Table 4. Summary of regression analysis for variables predicting creativity and functionality
Variable B SE B b
Creativity
External regulation 23.19 .043 2.077
Introjected regulation 4.17 .045 .195
Identified regulation 21.95 .048 2.401
Integrated regulation 22.33 .039 2.119
Functionality
External regulation 23.99 .034 2.219
Introjected regulation 3.02 .037 .172
Identified regulation 22.91 .039 2.142
Integrated regulation 22.49 .031 2.016
Notes: B5regression coefficient; SE B5standard error of B; b5standardized regression coefficient. Creativity
regressed simultaneously on all regulation coding processes and was non-significant, R250.03; R2 adj520.075,
F(4. 37)50.288: p50.884. Functionality regressed simultaneously on all regulation coding processes and was
non-significant, R250.48, R2 adj50.055, F(4. 37)50.464: p50.762.
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Discussion
This study tried to yield information not previously available in the literature on
human performance: the first detailed specification of particular self-regulated
behaviours that were hypothesised to predict observable creativity in actual products
made by participants and the first account in mediating self-regulation on rewards
impact on creativity. The method of measuring self-regulation used in this study did
not, however, uncover those self-regulated factors that were related to creativity.
These self-regulated factors were not found to predict the variance in creativity in
regression analyses. This study aimed to contribute to the research in self-regulation
in another way as well. Former studies have only investigated the impact of self-
regulation in educational settings (Ryan, Connell & Plant, 1990; Sansone &
Harackiewicz, 1996; Schiefele, 1991; Vallerand & Bissonette, 1992), while this study
is, to our awareness, the only experimental one.
Reward Groups and Self-regulation
The only difference between the three groups on RAI was obtained between the
control group and the performance-contingent reward group. There was no
difference between the groups on the four subscales of self-regulation except for
integrated regulation (external, introjected and identified regulation). There was a
marginal difference between the performance-contingent reward group and the
control group also on integrated regulation. The regression analyses also indicated a
positive effect of introjected regulation on creativity, but not of the other forms of
self-regulation. However, the manipulation with reward contingencies to affect the
level of self-regulation could have been too weak to be manifested in the AMS
measurement. Some theorists have suggested that the undermining effect of rewards
on motivation and creativity, this unwillingness or inability to experiment with
creative ideas, can be explained by a simple ‘‘diffusion of attention’’ or ‘‘competing
response’’ model (Reiss & Sushinsky, 1975). In other words, individuals who are
promised a reward are distracted by their excitement about the soon-to-be-delivered
effect. However, for methodological reasons, the soon-to-be-delivered effect of
rewards was not administered in this study. The participants were instructed that the
reward was to be given to them at a following lecture. This could be one potential
reason why the three reward groups displayed nearly the same level of self-
regulation. Support for validity of the version of the AMS used in this study was
acceptable, so the conclusion is therefore taken that the manipulation of rewards
could have been too weak to be manifested in the AMS measurement. For instance,
lottery tickets, a DVD gift certificate or a gift where the price cannot easily be
determined, might have resulted in stronger findings than the pen with the
University logo. Still, the results are important as they lean towards an interesting
outcome, that is, the marginal difference in integrated regulation between the
performance-contingent reward group and the control group.
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Creativity
Participants in the control group and the engagement-contingent reward group had
significantly higher score in creativity in relation to participants in the performance-
contingent reward group. Participants in the control group and the engagement-
contingent reward group were, on the other hand, not significantly different in
creativity from each other. These findings are supported by the meta-analytic study by
Deci et al. (1999). Offering individuals a performance-contingent reward will make the
individual less motivated to experiment with creative ideas in relation to individuals
who are not offered such a reward. Offering individuals an engagement-contingent
reward was found not to undermine motivation and, therefore, participants in the
engagement-contingent reward group and the control group should have the same level
of motivation to experiment with creative ideas. Some theorists, including Deci and
Ryan (e.g. Deci & Ryan, 1996), have also theorised that performance-contingent
rewards are more likely to be controlling and affect individuals in a negative way in
performance than do engagement-contingent rewards. The results on creativity in the
present study yield support for such arguments.
It was hypothesised that the manipulation with rewards would affect the
participant’s self-regulation, with performance-contingent rewards inducing a lower
level of internalisation than engagement-contingent rewards and mediating the
level of self-regulation on creativity. Results indicated that no such mediation
existed, but it was clear that the participants in the performance-contingent reward
group had a lower score in creativity than participants in the engagement-
contingent reward group and the control group. If self-regulation didn’t mediate
the motivational aspects of reward contingencies, what did? It may be explained by
a lack of adequate methods to capture the levels of self-regulation and its
mediation effect on creativity. It can, however, also be explained by an interference
with an unknown dimension.
The Salience of Autonomy as a Mediating Dimension
The unknown dimension could be autonomy. Large amounts of research have
investigated the impact of reward-contingencies on intrinsic motivation (Deci et al.,
1999) and have found an undermining effect on intrinsic motivation by
performance-contingent rewards but not by engagement-contingent rewards. Lack
of autonomy has been the major explanation (Feist, 1999). In the present study,
such an undermining effect caused by performance-contingent reward but not for
engagement-contingent reward could have taken place that mediated the effect of
motivation on creativity. However, this was not controlled for.
An explanation could be that rewards, unlike experienced success and failure
(see Grouzet et al. 2004), have the ability to trigger intrinsic motivation, but not
self-regulation. A reason for this could be that self-regulation is dependent to a
higher extent on performance feedback. It may also be proposed that psychological
factors like competence and relatedness are produced not to the same extent as
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autonomy by the introduction of rewards. Even if we assume that autonomy may be
a common product of both reward and experienced success/failure, this factor
alone may not be forceful enough to set the whole process of self-regulation in
motion.
Creativity and Functionality
The main reason to separate the functionality value from the creativity value was to
receive a more specific structure of the three groups’ self-regulated style and its
impact on creativity and functionality. That is, low self-regulated individuals
should achieve a low score in creativity and functionality. If the individual didn’t
care to experiment with creative ideas, the individual should also be more carefree
with, for example, time consuming and ethical standards. Creativity and
functionality were not significantly correlated with each other, so no such
conclusions can be drawn. Further, the four motivational subscales were also
found not to predict the proportions of the functionality variance in regression
analysis. However, it must be noted that the interjudge reliability concerning both
these variables was quite low, which makes it difficult to draw any clear
conclusions about their interrelation.
Methodological Implications
Although the way of measuring self-regulation didn’t result in the desired outcome,
this way of defining and viewing motivation is an important step further in the area of
motivation research. For example, if individuals do not experience intrinsic
motivation, how can external events, such as rewards, be examined for potential
roles in motivation? By measuring how an external event becomes internalised and
integrated in the regulatory process, one can understand how the external event is
experienced and more importantly, evaluate the potential of the external event as
being positive or negative for motivation and performance. Self-regulation is also
theorised and empirically supported to consist of four subscales (Vallerand &
Bissonnette, 1992) and by assessing those, one can examine different levels of self-
regulation and specify their effects on motivation and performance. However, there
may be other ways of measuring self-regulation than with questionnaires. One study
(Ruscio, Whitney, & Amabile, 1998) used different behavioural coding processes
and verbal protocols in assessing different predictors of creativity. Behavioural
coding may uncover variables that participants simply cannot report accurately, for
any number of reasons (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). Likewise, verbal protocol analysis
of concurrent verbalisations can identify thought processes that the participants may
hardly have been aware of. Self-regulation could easily be examined in behavioural
and verbal protocol analysis, which could provide an alternative way of measuring
self-regulation. A structured interview could also have been used as has been
demonstrated by Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons (1986).
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The method of examining creative performance using the consensual assessment
technique is found to be a reliable research tool to any psychological researcher
interested in relating social-psychological, personality or other types of variables to
actual observable outcomes (Amabile, 1982a, 1996). Not only can the task be
designed to match a certain target group, it has also the advantage of measuring real-
life performances. It is also worthy of note that, although the use of the consensual
assessment technique of studying creative processes or performances does have
advantages, there are several limitations as well. Developing creativity tasks is very
challenging and time consuming to evaluate. In addition, it may be difficult to apply
this assessment technique to products that are at the frontier of a particular domain
of endeavour. Consider, for example, revolutionary theories in science. It would be
difficult to apply this method to assess the creativity of these products because it is
precisely their revolutionary nature that makes it difficult for experts to agree on the
level of creativity evident.
For assessing self-regulation,we useda version of theAMS.However, itmust benoted
that there are alternative scales that also seem appropriate for this purpose. The reason is
that, in the present study, the factors that were manipulated (i.e. the reward conditions)
were situational, that is, here-and-now, whereas motivation in psychological research
may be regarded as more contextual (i.e. a group of situations). The difference between
situational and contextual levels is well explained, in, for instance, Vallerand (1997).
Most importantly, the use of a state motivation scale may have produced other results.
Indeed, while using such a scale, Guay, Vallerand and Blanchard (2000) found negative
effects of performance rewards on identified regulation and on intrinsic motivation.
Thus, by using a more state-sensitive scale, we could have discovered some significant
findings on SDT regulation components. Still, it may be argued that it is difficult to make
such propositions by inferring from one single study.
It could also be alleged that the AMS has limitations in assessing the
internalisation of rewards. For instance, according to Self-Determination Theory
(Deci & Ryan, 1985), the environment in terms of conditions (e.g. a reward) may
appear somewhat problematic to internalise. Often, individuals instead internalise
the reasons to do a task (or behaviours). Also, integration is a form of internalisation/
self-regulation that is difficult to detect at the situational level.
One further observation is that we did not have access to a multiple set of
measurement points (pre- and post-test) to verify to what extend the activity
conducted under the rewards was integrated or not. In addition, because
participants’ initial levels of intrinsic motivation towards the task were not assessed,
only a partial view could be provided of the internalisation process.
Finally, it must be noted that we used quite a restricted sample of university
students in the experiment, which makes it imperative to follow up these preliminary
results by additional experiments/field studies. In general, the findings were in the
predicted direction, however, they were not significant. The sample was small and,
hence, the power relatively low. Thus, the existence of a Type II error cannot
completely be ruled out.
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Future Research
The main challenge in the area of self-regulation is to develop several instruments to
examine different regulational styles. There are several limitations with using pen-
and-paper instruments to assess task engagement. By avoiding this, there are many
opportunities for future research to build on and expand the findings of the few
studies that have examined self-regulation and its determinants. The present study
once again showed that by altering external events, such as rewards, to have a
controlling and an informational feature, one can expect to find interesting patterns
in creative performance. By assessing both self-regulation and the knowledge about
the controlling and informational nature of external events, one can break the sets in
what predicts creative performance. In the immediate future, there are many
opportunities to expand creativity research by applying the latest findings in self-
regulation (Ryan, Connell, & Plant, 1990; Schiefele, 1991; Vallerand & Bissonnette,
1992) into new unexplored social-psychological domains. Some theorists (Vallerand
& Bissonnette, 1992) have also found it worthy to examine intrinsic motivation along
with extrinsic self-regulation and theorise that they could coexist. This may be a
fruitful construct to incorporate into future investigations of this kind. Almost every
study in the field of motivation has restricted its investigations to intrinsic motivation
(Deci & Ryan, 2000).
Finally, if researchers are to better understand the workings of social-psychological
processes in creativity and more confidently suggest implications for applied fields
such as organisational psychology, the field must move toward drawing such links
with real-world performances and real-world outcomes.
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